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SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW RELATING TO MURINICIPAL FINANCING OF
PUBLIC WORKS
E. H. FOLEY, JR.t

p

HREE billion, three hundred million dollars were appropriated by
the Seventy-third Congress to provide for the construction of useful public works.1 In June, 1934, a revolving fund was created by authorizing the sale to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation of securities acquired by the Federal Emergency Administration of Public
Works,' and in addition four hundred million dollars more were made
available for public works 3
Of the three billion seven hundred million dollars made available to
the Public Works Administration, over one billion dollars were allotted
for non-federal projects up to November 1, 1934. Included in this sum
are loans of two hundred million dollars made to railroads for maintenance and equipment and to private corporations for special purposes,
and the sum of one hundred million dollars reserved for low-cost housing
and slum clearance projects. The remaining seven hundred millions have
been allotted by way of loans and grants to states, counties, municipalities and other public bodies.
States and their political subdivisions submitted more than nine thousand applications seeking approximately four and one-half billion dollars
from the federal government to aid in the financing of their public
works projects. This superabundance of applications made it possible
for the Administrator ' to include in the comprehensive program of
public works only those projects which, after a thorough consideration
of their technical, economic and legal soundness, were found acceptable
by the Engineering, Finance and Legal Divisions of the Public Works
Administration. On the first of November, 1934, the Legal Division
had examined 7,126 applications,' had approved 6,590, had written
tfDirector, Legal Division, Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works. This
article is largely based on an address delivered by the author before the Municipal Corporations Section of the American Bar Association at its annual meeting at Milwaukee,
Wisconsin, August 27, 1934.
1. P. L. No. 67, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
2. P. L. No. 412, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
3. Four hundred million dollars were made available by President Roosevelt pursuant
to P. L. No. 412, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
4. By Eaxc. ORDER No. 6198, July 8, 1933, President Roosevelt designated Harold L.
Ickes as Federal Emergency Administrator of Public Works.
5. This figure includes applications for grants only as well as those for grants together
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contracts covering 4,002 projects, and had closed more than 900 municipal loans after approving in each case the bond transcript of proceed.
ings, as well as all the other legal steps taken in connection with the
authorization, financing and construction of the projects.
From the state of New York alone more than 425 applications were
submitted by cities, villages, counties, towns, districts, authorities and
the state itself. By November 1, 1934, 253 of these applications had
been approved, contracts covering more than 248 projects had been
executed and more than 85 of these were actually under construction.'
When the public works program was inaugurated, the procedure
for financing local public improvements in many states was cumbersome and unsatisfactory. Laws relating to the power of non-federal
governmental agencies to borrow money for public works projects were in
many instances unsettled or doubtful. An analysis of the legislation delegating to municipal corporations and other public bodies powers to
construct and finance public works and removing procedural obstructions
as well as of cases instituted to clarify or settle doubtful constitutional
or statutory difficulties forms the basis for this discussion.
New State Legislation
Oftentimes the history of legislation is the record of the response to
the needs of particular situations. 7 This has been again demonstrated
with loans. An applicant may be able to finance a project in whole or in part otherwise
than by a sale of its obligations to the United States and wishes nevertheless to obtain a
grant. In such a case the grant (30 per centum of the cost of the labor and materials
employed upon the project) is made if the project is approved by the Administrator and
the applicant enters into an agreement with the United States whereby all work on the
project is done subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Administrator to
carry out the purposes and control the administration of the Act. Agreements providing
for a loan and grant contain a provision that, in the event the obligations which the United
States agrees to purchase are sold to a purchaser other than the Government, the United
States will nevertheless make a grant of 30 per centum of the cost of the labor and
materials employed upon the project.
6. A few of the larger projects in the State of New York are: Trl-Borough Bridgo
Authority, $44,200,000 (Toll Bridge); Port of New York Authority, $37,500,000 (Tunnol);
City of New York, $23,160,000 (Subway), $4,000,000 (Garbage Disposal), $3,830,000
(Hospital), $2,500,000 (School), $2,268,500 (Schools), $1,193,000 (Pier Sheds), $1,198,300
(Health Buildings), $1,868,000 (Disposal Plant), $1,148,000 (Hospital), $1,110,800 (High
School), $1,101,000 (High School), $1,013,000 (Waterworks), $1,000,000 (Water Mains).
$25,245,000 (Ward's Island Sewage Treatment Works, application pending); Erie County,
$3,101,333 (Highway); St. Lawrence Bridge Commission, $2,800,000 (Ogdensburg Toll
Bridge); Westchester County, $2,085,000 (Sanitary Sewers), $1,825,000 (Court House);
Rochester, $1,490,000 (School); Buffalo, $1,429,000 (Storm Sewer), $1,198,900 (High
School), $1,148,370 (Storm Sewers); Utica, $1,295,000 (Schools); Jamestown, $1,222,000
(School).
7. For example: An Act to Regulate Public Warehouses and the Warehousing and
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by the experience of PWA during the last eighteen months. Many
municipalities were entangled in a network of limitations and found themselves without powers sufficiently extensive to enable them to secure
the benefits of the National Industrial Recovery Act. States alert to the
exigencies of the times recognized that legal machinery which had served
adequately for decades could not be adjusted to the high speed with
which the federal government was capable of extending credit at a time
when speed was essential to obtain the results desired by both the federal and local governments. The need was at once apparent for a
revision of the statutes authorizing and regulating municipal financing.
In states where constitutions are long statute-like documents of detail
rather than bills of rights and short statements of fundamental principles, the outlook was discouraging both to lawyers and legislators. The
southern states particularly, in a laudable attempt to prevent a recurrence
of the wildcat public financing of the post Civil War days, had sought
by constitutional amendment to protect taxpayers from outlandish extravagances. These states now found themselves in a condition of legal
paralysis. The credit of Georgia and of its cities and towns stands
almost unparalleled, and yet, because of the zeal of its Constitutional
Convention of 1877 in limiting the power of the state and its municipalities to borrow money, this state and its municipalities have been prevented from participating in the benefits of the national program of public works on the same footing with other borrowers.
The situation was more encouraging in other parts of the country.
Legislatures not hampered by constitutional restrictions were convened
in extraordinary session to enact laws, many of which were drafted with
the cooperation of PWA, to simplify the procedure for the authorization
Inspection of Grain, adopted by the Illinois Legislature to correct abuses in the business
of storing and inspecting grain in Chicago, 1l. Laws 1871-2, p. 762; Bunn v. Illinois, 94
U. S. 113 (1876); The Packers and Stockyards Act, to correct deplorable conditions in the
packing industry, 42 STAT. 159 (1921); The District of Columbia rent laws, adopted by
Congress to meet the housing problem resulting from conditions created by the WVorld
War, 41 STAT. 297, 304 (1919); Block v. Hirhsch, 256 U. S. 135 (1921); The Court of
Industrial Relations Act of Kansas, adopted for the purpose of insuring continuity of
operation in coal mining and other businesses after the wide-spread strike of coal miners
in 1919, Kan. Laws Spec. Sess. 1920, c. 29; Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 262 U. S. 522 (1923); The Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law, adopted
in 1933 to afford temporary relief to mortgagors oppressed by "the severe finandal and
economic depression existing for several years past," Mlinn. Laws 1933, p. 514; Home
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdel, 290 U. S. 398 (1934). The statement in the text is
implicit in the rule for construing remedial legislation: "There are three points to be
considered in the construction of all remedial statutes; the old law, the mischief, and the
remedy: that is, how the common law stood at the making of the act; what the mischief
was, for which the common law did not provide; and what remedy the parliament hath
provided for the mischief." 1 BL. CoM. * 87, Co. Lrrr. 11, 42.
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and financing of public improvements and to remove time-consuming
impediments.
Laws which required a long period of notice before elections, public
hearings or bond sales could be held, were either suspended or modified
in order to permit municipalities to borrow money without delay so that
construction of projects might begin quickly. In some instances a desire
to accomplish too much resulted in almost complete frustration. In
New York State, for example, a statute declared that all laws which
tended to prevent municipalities from taking advantage of the provisions
of the National Industrial Recovery Act should be inoperative.8 This
hastily conceived statute was so ambiguous and so indefinite that its
application to a particular case frequently could not be determined.
Another instance was an act passed by the New Jersey Legislature0 containing a provision that municipalities operating under it could borrow
from the federal government an amount not to exceed seventy per cent
of the total cost of a given project, failing to take into account the fact
that the discretion of the Administrator was limited, in making grants
under the National Industrial Recovery Act, to an amount not exceeding
thirty per cent of the cost of only the labor and materials employed in the
construction of a project.10 Both of these acts created difficult situations.
After valuable time had been consumed the New Jersey Act was repealed" and the New York Act thoroughly revised." A substitute New
Jersey Act,'$ and the revised New York Act, now assist materially the
political subdivisions of those states in participating in the recovery
program. When representatives of the state of New Mexico consulted
the officials of PWA as to ways and means of simplifying the procedure
for the financing and construction of public works in that state, the experience of New York and New Jersey was drawn upon with the result
that a workable bill was prepared with no loss of time and was enacted
into law at a special session called for that purpose.'4
Additional statutes which had as their primary purpose the conferring
of further powers upon municipal corporations, as distinguished from
the elimination of procedural restrictions, were passed by the legislatures
of many states. Such laws were necessary in states where limitations
had been imposed upon the character of public improvements which
municipalities might undertake, and the mode of financing these im8.
9.
10.
11:
12.

Laws of New York, 1933, c. 782.
N. J. Pamnph. Laws, 1933, c. 328.
P. L. No. 67, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) § 203 (a) (2).
N. J. Pamph. Laws, 1933, c. 416.
Laws of New York, 1934, c. 104.

13.

N. J. Pamph. Laws, 1933, c. 428.

14.

N. M. Sess. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 6.
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provements. This type of legislation removed statutory limitations upon
debt-incurring power, delegated broad authority to municipal officials to
make such contracts with purchasers of bonds as were deemed to be in the
best interests of municipalities, provided that bonds might be issued

notwithstanding any limitations prescribed by other laws and frequently
fixed the procedure for the issuance of bonds so that it was not necessary
to conform such procedure to the provisions of existing statutes. The
commonwealth of Virginia led the way in this type of legislation;'8
followed closely by Delaware, 6 and Maryland.17 The state of Colorado went so far as to authorize the issuance of bonds by cities and
villages without regard to any of the limitations or restrictions contained
in her constitution.' The Colorado Act, not unlike Section 203 (d)
of the Recovery Act,'9 might be referred to as "A Legislator's Prayer."'
The legislation enacted in Virginia, Delaware and Maryland was
couched in terms of a general bond code, the operation of which was
limited to a period of two or three years. In some of the New England
states the exercise of the broad powers conferred by similar legislation
is made dependent upon the approval of a state supervising authority.
In New Hampshire the consent of the Governor and Council is necessary; 2 ' in Rhode Island the consent of the Emergency Public Works
Commission22 and in Massachusetts the consent of the Emergency Finance Board.2s Time which might otherwise be gained through the
removal of procedural restraints by these acts is more than off-set by
the delay occasioned by these supervisory commissions in investigation
and review which in a large measure duplicates, step by step, the investigation and review by the federal organizations set up in these states
by PWA. 4 The centralization of power over municipal financing has,
15. Va. Acts Extra Sess. 1933, c. 26. Constitutionality sustained, Nelson v. Town of
Culpepper, decided by Circuit Court of Culpepper County, appeal refused, Supreme Court
of Appeals, (unreported) 1934.
16. Del. 2d Spec. Sess. Gen. Assembly, H. B. No. 3, approved Dec. 14, 1933.
17. Md. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 30.
18. Colo. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 16.
19. P. L. No. 67, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) § 203(d): "The President, in his dicretion, and under such terms as he may prescribe, may extend any of the benefits of
this title to any state, county or municipality notwithstanding any constitutional or legal
restriction or limitation on the right or power of such state, county or municipality to
borrow money or incur indebtedness."
20. Legis. (1934) 47 HARv. L. Ray. 688, 690: "Only a prayer can accompany such
legislation."
21. N. H. P. L. 1933, c. 162.
22. R. I. P. L. June Sess. 1933, c. 2078.
23. Mass. Acts 1933, c. 49.
24. For a summary of the organization of PWA, see Coyle, Public Works and tIle PTVA.
(1934) 112 ENG_,. NEws Rc. 181.
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however, compensatory features when placed in the hands of experienced,
impartial and far-sighted officials of the state.
Development of the "Authority"
Another result of legislation enacted to assist in the present program
of public works is the development of the so-called "authority" as an
instrumentality of government. Probably the best known authority is the
Port of New York Authority. This Authority came into existence in
1921 as the result of a compact between the states of New York and
New Jersey, approved by joint resolution of Congress.2" Its purpose
was to develop the Port of New York and to coordinate the terminal,
transportation and other facilities of commerce in the territory surrounding New York harbor. Power was conferred to build bridges, tunnels
and terminals. Income derived from the use of such facilities was pledged
to pay the indebtedness incurred for their construction.
The development of the idea of the authority raises this interesting
question: Can a state empower such a body to incur a debt which will
not be held to be that of the state itself? The present Chief Justice of
the United States before he returned to the Supreme Court Bench was
asked for an opinion upon the questions relating to the validity of the
organization of the Port of New York Authority, its power and immunities
and the status of bonds proposed at that time to be issued by the Authority for the construction of certain bridges.2 In the course of his opinion
he summarized with apparent approval an opinion of the Attorney
General of New Jersey2 holding that the Port Authority was a municipal
corporate instrumentality of the states of New York and New Jersey,
and as such was legally a proper body to receive appropriations made by
the New Jersey Legislature for its legitimate purposes; that the legislature could make a definite appropriation to the objects of an instrumentality of the states; that there was no requirement that the money
appropriated be actually in hand; and that, should an appropriation be
25. Such as the Local Government Commission of North Carolina, N. C. P. L. 1931, c.
60. See also the Municipal Finance Commission of New Jersey, N. J. Pamph. Laws 1931,
c. 340, particularly as amended by N. J. Pamph. Laws 1932, c. 236 and N. J. Pamph.
Laws 1933, c. 330, and as supplemented by N. J. Pamph. Laws 1933, c. 331. Constitutionality sustained, Hourigan v. North Bergen Tp., 172 Atl. 193 (N. J. 1934).
26. Laws of New York, 1921, c. 154; N. J. Pamph. Laws 1921, c. 151; 42 STAT. 174
(1921); Laws of New York, 1922, c. 43; N. J. Pamph. Laws 1922, c. 9; 42 STAT. 822
(1922).
27.. Opinion of Hon. Charles Evans Hughes to Hon. Julian A. Gregory, Chairman,
Port of New York Authority, dated Nov. 10, 1925. See Laws of New York, 1924, c. 230;
N. J. Pamph. Laws 1924, c. 125; Laws of New York, 1924, c. 186; N. J. Pamph. Laws
1924, c. 149; 43 STAT. 1094 (1925).
28. Opinion, Att'y Gen., N. J. (Mar. 5, 1925).
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made, no debt or liability of the state would be incurred, nor would
such an appropriation constitute a lending of the credit of the state
within the prohibition of the New Jersey constitution.
Except in connection with the legislative appropriations, neither the
opinion of the Chief Justice nor the opinion of the Attorney General
discusses the question whether or not the bonds of the Authority constitute a debt of either state. Undoubtedly the point was not more fully
considered in these opinions because of the well-settled principle of law
that a public corporation may be created as a distinct legal entity apart
from the state creating it, the debts of which are the debts of the corporation and not debts of the state. One possible limitation is that if
the corporation mortgages property belonging to the state as security for
a loan to the corporation a debt of the state is created. Application of
this limitation is found in a recent opinion of the Justices of the Supreme
Court of Rhode Island in reviewing legislation enacted to permit a corporation constituted as an entity, separate from the state, to obtain a loan
from PWA. - ' The corporation had been formed with the Governor, Commissioner of Finance, and the Chairman of the State House and Senate
Finance Committees as its officers. All of the stock of the corporation,
which consisted of one share of no-par value, was issued to the state.
The articles of association of the corporation expressly declared that the
corporation "shall have no power to incur state debts but only debts of
itself as a separate corporate entity." The act also authorized the corporation to pledge or transfer title of property of the state as security
for the payment of amounts due the federal government. In an advisory
opinion the Justices of the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the
debts incurred by the corporation were not debts of the state if no
property of the state was mortgaged as security, but that if any property
of the state was mortgaged, a debt of the state was created.-" The
Justices stated that in their opinion there was no difference in substance
between the obligation of the state to pay its direct debts and its duty
to redeem its property pledged as security for money expended for its
benefit.
There is a second possible limitation on the principle that a debt incurred by a public corporation is a debt of the corporation only. If the
corporation is a state agency with powers coextensive with the state
itself and in point of fact is really a department or arm of state government, supported entirely or almost entirely by legislative appropriations,
a debt incurred by it may constitute a debt of the state notwithstanding
its corporate status.3 '
29. R. I. P. L. June Sess. 1933, c. 2078, §§ 3, 7; R. I. Co:zsT. art. IV, § 13.
30. In re Opinion to the Governor, 169 At. 748 (R. I. 1933).
31. Wilson, Att'y Gen. v. State Water Supply Commrision, 84 N. J. Eq. 150, 93 AU.
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In view of these limitations, the Act creating the Port of New York
Authority and other similar acts creating authorities in states with
constitutional limitations respecting state debts similar to those in New
York and New Jersey, must be sustained upon the theory that the debts
of such authorities are the debts of separate and subordinate instrumentalities akin to the debts of municipal corporations.
It is, of course, well established that a constitutional limitation on the
power of the state to incur a debt has no application to local or municipal
indebtedness. 2 The legislature may be able to grant a power and at the
same time be unable directly to exercise a similar power. A contrary
view would overthrow the legality of municipal bonds in a state prohibiting the legislature from incurring a debt. The reasoning of the courts
in cases treating of obligations of a municipal corporation proper should
apply with equal force to obligations of an authority when the authority
is an independent legal entity, with power to undertake a revenue-producing enterprise and to raise revenues by fees, tolls or other charges, but
has no power to encumber the property of the state as security for such
obligations, and when the statute provides that such obligations shall be
that of the authority alone.
In the state of New York during the years 1933 and 1934 a nuinber
of statutes were enacted creating authorities, based upon the principles
of the Port of New York Authority legislation, but more restricted in
scope of purposes. The Legislature declared these authorities to be
public benefit corporations.3" Their governing bodies were usually appointed by the Governor, although in one or two instances they were
appointed by the legislature. Each authority was given power to construct a designated project such as a bridge 3 4 health resort, 5 an astro732 (1915); McClain v. Regents of the University, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1928). But
cf. Christman v. Wilson, 187 Ky. 644, 221 S. W. 198 (1920).
32. See e.g., People v. Flagg, 46 N. Y. 400, 406 (1871).
33. GENER. CoipoaATOio LAW, Laws of New York, 1929, c. 650, art. 1, § 3 (2): "A

'public benefit corporation' is a corporation organized to construct or operate a public
improvement wholly or partly within the state, the profits from which enure to the
benefit of this or other states, or to the people thereof."
34. Tri-Borough Bridge Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 145; New York State
Bridge Authority, Laws of New York, 1932, c. 548 as amended by Laws, 1933, c. 67;
Lake Champlain Bridge Commission, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 201; Niagara Frontier
Bridge Commission, Laws of New York, 1929, c. 594 as amended by Laws, 1930, c. 827,
Laws, 1931, c. 380, Laws, 1933, c. 89 and Laws, 1934, c. 300; Thousand Island Bridge
Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 209; Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 824.
35. Saratoga Springs Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 208.
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nomical planetarium," a motor parkway," a produce market,39 and industrial exhibit,3 9 or a public park and public recreation center.4 0 In
addition, power was conferred to issue bonds not in excess of a stated
amount, levy and collect charges for the use of the facility, prescribe
the remedies of the bondholders in the event of default, restrict the construction of competing facilities, limit the issuance of additional bonds
and enter into such agreements with the holders of the bonds as might
be deemed advisable to secure the payment of the obligations. A commendable feature of this method of construction of public improvements
is that, when all the bonds of the authority are finally discharged, the
title to the property passes to the state or the city of New York and
the life of the authority terminates. The creation of New York authorities4 ' has perhaps made it unnecessary for the legislature to pass a revenue bond law, common in many other states, authorizing the issuance of
bonds by the state or by its municipalities payable solely out of the
income of the enterprise for the financing of which the bonds were
issued 4
A further development of the authority as a governmental instrumentality has been seen recently in the commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The Supreme Court of that state in 1912 decided that bonds payable
solely out of revenues of a waterworks system constituted an indebtedness within the meaning of the state constitution. The court stated:
36. American Museum of Natural History Planetarium Authority, Laws of New York,
1933, c. 214 as amended by Laws, 1933, c. 817.
37. Jones Beach State Parkway Authority, Laws of New York, c. 70; Pelham Portchester Parkway Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 68; Henry Hudson Parkway
Authority, Laws of New York, 1934, c. 138; Marine Parkway Authority, Laws of New
York, 1934, c. 162.

33. Central New York Regional Market Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 232;
Lower Hudson Regional Market Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 231.
39. Industrial Exhibit Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 246 as amended by
Laws, 1934, c. 304.
40. Bethpage Park Authority, Laws of New York, 1933, c. 801.
41. The development of authorities has perhaps been more marked in New York than
elsewhere. Typical instances of authorities created by other states: The Alabama State
Bridge Corporation (Ala. Acts 1927, p. 278), discussed in Alabama State Bridge Corp. v
Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695 (1928); California Toll Bridge Authority (Cal. St. 1929,
c. 763), discussed in In re California Toll Bridge Authority, 212 Cal. 293, 293 Pac. 485
(1931) and in California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 218 Cal. 7, 21 P. (2d) 425
(1933); Hackensack River Sewerage Authority (N. J. Pamph. Laws 1933, c. 373); Allegheny County Authority (Pa. P. L. Spec. Sess. 1933-34, 114) discuszed in Tranter v.
Allegheny County Authority, 173 Atl. 289 (Pa. 1934); and by the Federal Government:
St. Lawrence Bridge Commission, P. L. No. 52, 73d Cong, 1st SLs. (1933).
42. An amendment last year to the General City Law prohibits the isuance of obligations by a city unless it has pledged its faith and credit for payment of the principal and
interest thereof. Laws of New York, 1933, c. 390.
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"To permit a borough or city to borrow money under a contract that it
shall not be liable for its repayment, but that the lender must look solely to
pledged municipal property or assets, would, in effect, annul the constitutional
restriction on municipal improvidence and strike down a safeguard against
municipal profligacy.

' 43

*In June of 1934, the same court had before it for consideration an
act under which the Allegheny County Authority had been created for
the purpose of constructing, maintaining and operating bridges, tunnels,
streets and highways in Allegheny County.4 4 The Authority was empowered, among other things, to charge and collect fees, tolls and rentals,
to borrow money and issue bonds and secure the payment of the bonds
by a pledge of revenues. An allotment in the amount of thirty million
dollars was made to the Authority by PWA. A taxpayer's suit wai
brought to enjoin the Authority from executing a loan and grant agreement with the federal government. It was argued before the court that
the creation of the Authority was a fictitious design to evade the consti.
tutional limitation on the indebtedness of counties and that the bonds
of the Authority were, in effect, obligations of Allegheny County. The
court, although approving its original holding, decided that the obligations of the Authority were not the debts of the county, because the county had neither agreed to pay them nor could it be required to do so. The
court said: "It is never an illegal evasion to accomplish a desired result,
lawful in itself, by discovering a legal way to do it."'45
It is important to note that although the Act providing for the creation of the Authority authorized it to secure any of its obligations by
mortgage on any of its property, the indenture of trust which was before
the court provided only for a pledge of the income of the Authority
derived from the revenue producing improvements to be undertaken.
The court emphasized that the highways, bridges and tunnels which
constituted the project could not be foreclosed and sold in satisfaction of
the debt of the Authority but could only be controlled for such limited
time and extent as might be necessary to pay the debt out of the revenues
received in accordance with the terms of the indenture.
The attitude of the Pennsylvania court will probably be adopted by
other courts which may have occasion to pass upon similar questions.
The way will thus be opened to a more widespread use of the Authority
as an instrumentality for undertaking revenue producing enterprises.
The future will no doubt witness the extension of the use of the Authority
as a self-sustaining public corporation to carry on various governmental
43.
44.
45.

Lesser v. Warren Borough, 237 Pa. 501, 85 At. 839 (1912).
Act of Dec. 22, 1933, Pa. Spec. Sess. 1933-34, P. L. 114.
Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 173 At. 289 (Pa. 1934).
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activities, mainly for the reason that through such instrumentalities public
improvements can be effectuated without imposing additional burdens
of debt amortization or sinking fund payments upon taxpayers and
without adding to the indebtedness of the state or any of its municipali-

ties.48

The Public Works Administration has suggested in appropriate

cases the passage of legislation creating this type of public corporation

as a means for the construction of sound revenue producing projects.

Constitutional Limitations on State Indebtedness
Another application of the principle that obligations issued by an
incorporated instrumentality of a state are not debts of the state may
be found in the line of cases holding that bonds issued by state institutions do not constitute indebtedness of the state.

This principle has

been applied to permit the issuance of bonds by state universities in
Idaho,47 Louisiana,4" Minnesota, 4 New Mexico,

state boards of education in

Georgia, 2

0

and Wyoming,"' by

Montana,"2 and Virginia, 4 by

agricultural colleges in North Dakota and Oklahomae and by a state
normal school and a state tuberculosis sanatorium in Montana. 0 These
46. Two additional reasons for the use of the Authority in the field of port development have been pointed out: (1) It relieves the state or municipality of legal liability,
arising either ex contractu or ex delicto, in connection with the operation of the enterprise and places the burden where it belongs, upon the operation itself; (2) It affords a
convenient method of merging existing public bodies, theretofore exercising various port
functions, without sacrificing continuity of policy or personnel. See What Authority has
an Authority? address by Cohen, J. H., delivered before the American As-ociation of Port
Authorities, Toronto, Canada, Sept. 5, 1933.
47. IoTAno CoNsT. art IV, § is; State ex rd. Black v. State Board of Ed., 33 Idaho
415, 196 Pac. 201 (1921).

48. La. Act. No. 145, 1876; Caldwell Bros. v. Board of Supervisor, 176 La. 825, 147
So. 5 (1933).
49. Minn. Laws 1927, c. 442; Fanning v. University of Minnesota, 183 Minn. 222,
236 N. W. 217 (1931).
50. N. Al. Laws 1927, c. 47; State v. Regents, 32 N. At. 428, 258 Pac. 571 (1927). See
N. M. Laws Spec. Sess. 1934, c. 19.
51. Wyo. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 21; Arnold v. Bond, 34 P. (2d) 28 (Wyo. 1934).
52. Ga. Laws 1931, p. 20; State v. Regents, 175 S. E. 567 (Ga. 1934).
53. Mont. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 10; State ex rel. Veeder v. State Board of Ed,
33 P. (2d) 516 (Mont. 1934); Mont. Laws 1927, c. 94; Barbour v. State Board of Ed,
92 Mont. 321, 13 P. (2d) 225 (1932).
54. Va. Acts Extra Sess. 1933, c. 49; Philips v. University of Virginia, 97 Va. 472, 34
S. E. 66 (1889).
55. N. D. Laws 1929, c. 102; State ex rel. Kaufman v. Davis, 59 N. D. 191, 229 N. W.
105 (1930) ; Okla. Laws 1931, c. 34, art. 6; Baker v. Carter, 25 P. (2d) 747 (Okla. 1933).
56. Mont. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 7; State ex re. Blume v. State Board of Ed., 34
P. (2d) 515 (Mont. 1934); Mont. Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 22; State ex rel. Hawkins
v. State Board of Examiners, 35 P. (2d) 116 (Mont. 1934).
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cases rest partly on the ground that the bonds issued by a state institution are debts only of the institution, and not of the state, and partly
on the ground that the bonds Ire payable out of a special fund raised
from sources other than taxation. A recent case in Georgia rests its
decision solely on the first ground57 and a decision in Oregon is based
solely on the second ground,5 although most of the decisions are based
on both grounds indiscriminately. 9 The limitations mentioned above
in connection with Authorities, namely that the Authority may not mortgage property of the state and that the Authority, though a body corporate, may be so completely an administrative arm of the state as to
be in effect a department of state government, perhaps may also be
applied by some courts to obligations of state institutions.0 0
There are a few cases involving the application of constitutional pro.
hibitions against the incurring of debts by States themselves which have
come before the courts as a result of attempts on the part of States to
secure loans from PWA, which may be of some interest in showing
the progress of the law. The State of Kansas applied for a loan of
twenty-two million dollars under an act which authorized the State
Highway Commission to issue warrants payable out of a fund derived
from special taxes on motor vehicles and fuel."' The Highway Commission was a separate body corporate organized to carry forward, on
behalf of the State, the work of constructing and maintaining a system
of highways. The Supreme Court of Kansas held that although the
warrants were warrants of the State of Kansas, nevertheless they did not
constitute debts of the State within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition against the incurring of State debts because the farmers of
that prohibition were guarding against debts payable by a general prop57. State v. Regents, 175 S. E. 567 (Ga. 1934).
58. Ore. Laws 1927, p. 364; McLain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1928).
59. Some of the decisions, based on the ground that the bonds are payable out of a
special fund, involve bonds payable, not out of revenues derived from the undertaking
financed thereby, but bonds payable out of the income of lands granted by the Federal
Government for university purposes, or the permanent school fund resulting from the
sale of such lands. State ex rel. Black v. State Board of Ed., 33 Idaho 415, 196 Pac. 201
(1921); State v. Regents, 32 N. M. 428, 258 Pac. 571 (1927); Arnold v. Bond, 34 P. (2d)
28 (Wyo. 1934); State ex rel. Blume v. State Board of Ed., 34 P. (2d) 515 (Mont. 1934).
Contra: State ex rel. Haire v. Rice, 33 Mont. 365, 83 Pac. 874 (1906), afj'd, 20-1 U. S. 291
(1907) ; State v. Candland, 36 Utah 406, 104 Pac. 285, 24 L. R. A. (N. s.) 1260 (1909) ;
Roach v. Gooding, 11 Idaho 244, 81 Pac. 642 (1905). On the nature of the obligation
imposed by the Federal Government, see Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U. S. 168 (1914), per

Holmes, J.
60. Wilder v. Murphy, 56 N. D. 436, 218 N. W. 156 (1928) (mortgage of state property); McLain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1928) (department of state
government).
61. Kan. Laws Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 98; Kan. Laws Spec. Seas. 1934, c, 4.
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erty tax and not against obligations payable out of a special tax, such as
a tax on motor vehicles and fuels.6 - Possibly the decision might also
be justified on the narrower ground that bonds payable out of a tax
levied only upon a class specially benefited by the use to which the
proceeds of the bonds are devoted are not debts of the State within the
constitutional limitation because their issuance cannot increase the
tax burdens of the State generally.
Some courts have recognized that there has been an emergency so
serious as to justify the relaxation of the debt limitations permitted by
their Constitutions only in the event of grave peril. Last year the Supreme Court of Washington held that conditions in that State were so
alarming, that an act of the Legislature authorizing the issuance of bonds
to suppress an insurrection was a valid enactment under a provision of
the State Constitution permitting the Legislature to authorize bonds for
such a purpose. 3 The court stated that it was not necessary to wait
until insurrection was actually present, but it would be sufficient if
insurrection were even incipient, and indicated that it was better to
allay revolt by bonds than by bullets. 4
On the other hand the Justices of the Supreme Court of Colorado,
though recognizing the existence of a grave emergency, in an advisory
opinion, declared that action "to defend the State" will not be warranted
until the State is threatened or attacked and that such threat or attack
must be by force of arms."
It was their opinion, therefore, that an
Act authorizing the issuance of ten million dollars of bonds to PWA,
the proceeds of which were to be used in giving employment in the
construction of highways, would be unconstitutional.
A case in Wyoming illustrates neatly the discomfort which must be
the lot of many judges who feel compelled by the law and the dictates
of duty to decide a case one way, when their training and habits of
thought sway them in the opposite direction. The Supreme Court of
Wyoming had before it an act authorizing the University of Wyoming
to issue bonds secured by the income of the University permanent land
62. State of Kansas ex re. Boynton v. State Highway Commission, 28 P. (2d) 770, 32
P. (2d) 493 (Kan. 1934). But cf. In re Senate Res. No. 2, etc., 31 P. (2d) 325 (Colo.
1933).

63. State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 23 P. (2d) 1 (Wash. 1933); Mushegon Heights
v. Danigelis, 253 Mich. 260, 235 N. W. 83, 73 A. L. R. 696 (1931).
64. "Prevention is always better than cure, whether in the body politic or in the human
body. Disorders which constitute 'incipient insurrection' were declared by the Legislature
and approved by the Governor as existing in this State at the time the combined legilation was enacted. It would seem to any rational mind that it is far better to cure insurrection or incipient insurrection by promoting prosperity rather than by the ue of
bullets." Per Holcomb, J., in State ex rel. Hamilton v. Martin, 23 P. (2d) 1 (Wash. 1933).
65. In re Senate Res. No. 2, etc., 31 P. (2d) 325 (Colo. 1933).
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fund for the construction of a liberal arts building. The Court resolved
the different legal questions presented in favor of the validity of the
bonds and then commented as follows:
"Courts will not hold a law invalid, if it can be upheld on any reasonable
ground, and we think we should uphold it in this case, leaving the blame for
any folly, if folly there is, to rest where it should,-with the Legislature and
the board of trustees of the University. .

.

.And . . . we should bear in mind

that our individual feeling of apprehension of future danger, if any, might
lead us to err. Speaking individually and generally, and not for the Court,
it is not, perhaps, surprising that such apprehension should exist and in no
small degree. The favorable aspects presented in the case at bar would have
a tendency to allay it in this particular instance, were it not for the fact that
here a new field, heretofore considered sacred, is invaded for the purpose of
exploration. Is there no end? Many of us were not brought up in the bosom
of luxury, nor did we sleep in marble halls. The village schools with their
humble surroundings, and the University campus, graced with edifices hoary
with age, seem to us to satisfy the longings for learning. We heard at that
time of the wrecks and ruins of the past brought about by mortgaging the
future, ordinarily generously indulged in under pretense of benefit to the children yet unborn, but often in reality with the purpose that the living may
enjoy the magnificence of the present at the expense of posterity-the forgotten man. We heard of the existence in the past of cities, once humming
with the glad refrain of hundreds of thousands of happy human beings, lying
now desolate, with their stately baths, their roomy porticoes, their sacred
shrines in ruins because no space, no corner, no nook had become exempt from
the invasion of the gatherer of public burdens. Do ruins tell tales merely to
be scorned? But perhaps we heard wrongly. Times change. Younger generations perhaps learn better than their elders. The tide of the day sweeps us
along into whirlpools which seem giddy. We can but hope that they may not
be what they seem. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed." 00
Revenue Bonds
Another significant development of the law of municipal corporations
is found in the extensive use by municipalities of revenue as distinguished
from tax obligations. The use of revenue bonds is usually predicated
upon express statutory enactments. Revenue bond laws authorize the
issuance of negotiable obligations payable solely from the gross or net
revenues of the utility constructed or improved with the proceeds from
their sale. Usually, they contain, for whatever it may be worth as a
declaration of the intention of the Legislature, a provision that such obligations shall not constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of any
statutory or constitutional restriction or limitation.
Power vested in the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932 to
66.

See Arnold v. Bond, 34 P. (2d) 28, 35 (Wyo. 1934).
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make loans for self-liquidating municipal enterprises 7 acted as a stimulus
for the adoption of such laws. The fact that PWA accepted revenue
bonds as security for loans to finance sound enterprises materially increased the number of statutes of this type.
More than half the States have enacted such legislation for the financing of waterworks or sewer systems. 5 As we have seen, several States
have adopted revenue bond acts authorizing the construction of dormitories or other campus buildings by State educational institutions'O
Some have passed revenue bond acts for the construction of toll-bridges.- °
Several have enacted laws of broader scope permitting the issuance of
such obligations for almost every conceivable type of revenue producing
enterprise. 71

The decisions rendered by the courts in passing upon the validity of
67. 47 STAT. 709, 711; P. L. No. 302, 72d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933) § 201 (a) (1).
68. Alabama: Acts of 1932, No. 264 and No. 265; Acts of 1933, No. 46, No. 47 and

No. 102; Arkansas: Laws of 1933, Act 131 and Act 132; California: Statutes 1933, c. 331;
Connecticut: Cum. Supp. 1933, c. 33a and c. 33b; Idaho: Laws 1933, c. 186; llinois: SmrnH-Hmwz Ray. STAT. 1933, c. 24, §§ 440-446, as amended by Ill. Laws 3d Spec,
Sess. 1933-34, p. 141; SafTr-HURD RaV. STAT. 1933, c. 24, § 490 h-r, as amended by
Ill. Laws 3d Spec. Sess. 1933-34, p. 128; Indiana: Laws of 1929, c. 155, as amended by
Laws 1931, c. 14 and Laws 1933, c. 254; Laws 1933, c. 190 and c. 235; Laws 1932, c. 61
as amended by Laws 1933, c. 187; Iowa: Code 1931, § 6134-dl as amended by Laws Extra
Sess. 1933-34, c. 74; G. A. 1933, c. 111 as amended by Laws Extra Sies. 1933-34, c. 71;
Kansas: KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1933), §§ 12-05 A; Kentucky: Ky. STAT. (Carroll, Supp. 1933), § 2741-L-23 and § 2741-L-44; Michigan: Pub. Acts 1933, Act 94; Pub.
Acts 1931, Act 316; Mississippi: Laws 1934, c. 316 and c. 317; Nebraska: Laws 1933,
c. 146; New Mexico: Laws 1933, c. 57 as amended by Laws 1934, c. 4; North Dakota:
Laws 1933, c. 179; Ohio: Gen. Code 1932, § 2293-29, §§ 3891-1 to 3S91-5; Oregon:
Laws 1933, c. 289; South Carolina: Acts 1933, Act 299 as amended by Acts 1934, Act.
798; South Dakota: Laws 1931, c. 194; Tennessee: Laws 1933, c. 68; Texas: R. C. S.
1925, art. 1111-1118 as amended by Acts 1927, c. 194, by Acts 1931, c. 314, and by Acts
3d Sess. 1932, c. 32; Utah: Laws 2d Spec. SLes. 1933, c. 22; Virginia: Acts 1933, c. 163;
Acts Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 26; Washington: Pierces 1933 Code, § 1217; West Virginia:
Acts 1st Extra Sees. 1933, c. 25, as amended by Acts 2d Extra Sees. 1933, c. 48; Acts 1st
Extra Sess. 1933, c. 26, as amended by Acts 2d Extra Sees. 1933, c. 49.
69. Arkansas: Laws 1933, Act 47; Montana: Laws 1929, c. 94; Laws Extra Ses.
1933, c. 7 and c. 10; New Mexico: Laws 1927, c. 49; North Dakota: Laws 1929, c. 102;
Oklahoma: Laws 1931, c. 34; Oregon: Laws 1927, c. 289; Virginia: Laws Extra Sees.
1933, c. 49; West Virginia: Acts 1933, c. 9 as amended by Acts Zd Extra Sees. 1933, c. 38;
Washington: Laws Extra Sess. 1933, c. 23 and c. 24; Wyoming: Laws Spec. Sees. 1933,
c. 21.
70. Alabama: Acts 1931, Act 118; Florida: Spec. Acts 1933, c. 16344, No. 487; Kentucky: Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1930), § 4356-4-5; Missouri: Laws Extra SLes. 1933-34, p.
115; South Carolina: Acts 1933, Act 299 as amended by Acts 1934, Act 798; West Virginia:
Acts 2d Extra Sess. 1933, c. 27.
71. For example: Michigan: Laws 1933, Act 94; Missippfi: Laws 1934, c. 316 and
c. 317; South Carolina: Acts 1933, Act 299 as amended by Acts 1934, Act 798; Utah:
Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 22.
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revenue bond legislation have given rise to the so-called "Special Fund
Doctrine." The questions usually presented in these cases are whether
revenue bonds constitute an indebtedness within the meaning of a constitutional limitation on the amount of indebtedness which may be incurred or whether constitutional provisions requiring a bond issue to
be approved at an election, or making mandatory the levy of a tax to
pay interest and principal on bonds, apply.72 The Special Fund Doctrine affirms that obligations payable solely from a special fund derived
from the revenues of the enterprise for which such obligations are issued
do not constitute a bond or a debt within the meaning of any such constitutional limitation or provision."3
72. Constitutional provisions limiting indebtedness: ALA. CONSr. §§ 225, 226; Aaz.
CONST. art. LX, § 8; ARK. CONsT. amend. No. 11; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 18; COLO. CoNsT,
art. XI, § 8; FLA. CoNsT. art. XII, § 17; GA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 7; ILL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 12; IND. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; IOWA CONsT. art. XI, § 3; KY. CONST. § 157-158:
LOUISIANA CONsT. art. XIV, § 24; MAINE CONST. arts. XXII, XXXIV; Micu. CoNsT. art.
VIII, § 24; Mo. ConsT. art. X, § 12; MONT. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 6; N. M. CoNsT. art, IX,
§ 13; N. Y. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 10; N. C. CoNsT. art. VII, § 7; N. D. CoNsT. art. XXXV,
§ 183; OILA. CONsr. art. X, § 26; PA. CoNsT. art. IX, §9 8, 15; S. C. CoNsr. art. VIII,
§ 7; S. D. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 4; Tax. CoxsT. art. XI, §§ 5, 7; UTrAH CONST. art. XIV,
§§ 3, 4; VA. CoNsT. art. CXXVII; WASH. CONST. art. VIII, § 6; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8;
Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 3; WYO. CoNsT. art. XVI, 99 4, 5.
Constitutional provisions requiring approval at elections: ALA. CONST. § 222; Aiz.
CONST. art. IX, § 8; CAL. CowsT. art. XI, § 18; COLO. CoxsT. art. XI, §§ 6, 7, 8; FLA. CoNsr.
art. IX, § 6; GA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. VIII, § 3; KY. CO, ST. §§ 157, 157a,
158; LA. CONST. art. XII, § 10 and art. XIV, § 14a; Micu. CoNsT. art. IV, § 49 and art,
VIII, § 10; Mo. CONsT. art. X, §§ 12, 12a; MONT. CONsT. art. XIII, §§ 5, 6; N. M. CoNST.
art. IX, §§ 8, 10, 11, 12; N. C. CONST. art. VII, § 7; N. D. CoNsT. art. XII,
§§ 183, 187; OKLA. CoNsT. art. X, §§ 26, 27; ORE. CONsr. art. XI, §§ 9, 10, 11; PA. CONST.
art. X, §§ 8, 15; S. C. CoNsT. art. VIII, §§ 5, 7; S. D. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; UTA CoNST,
art. XIV, § 3; VA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 115 (a) and art. VIII, § 127; WASH. CONST. art. VIII,
§ 6; W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 8; WYo. CoNsT. art. XVI, §§ 2, 4.
Constitutional provisions making mandatory levy of tax; ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 1;
CoLo. CoxsT. art. XI, § 8; FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 17; GA. CONST. art. VIII, § 10;
IDAHO CoNsT. art. VIII, § 3 ILL. CONST. art. IX, § 12; Ky. CONST. § 159; LA. CONST.
art. XIV, § 14a; MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 2; N. M. CoNsT. art. IX, § 12; OKLA. CONST.
art. X, §§ 26, 28; PA. CoNsT. art. X, § 10; S. D. CoNsT. art. XIII, § 5; Tax. CoNsT. art.
VII, § 5 and art. XI, § 3a; W. VA. CoNsT. art. X, § 8; Wis. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
73. Alabama: Alabama State Bridge Corp. v. Smith, 217 Ala. 311, 116 So. 695 (1928);
In re Opinions of Justices, 226 Ala. 18, 145 So. 481 (1933); In re Opinions of Justices,
226 Ala. 570, 148 So. 111 (1933); In re Opinions of Justices, 152 So. 901 (Ala. 1934);
Smith v. Town of Guin, 155 So. 865 (Ala. 1934); Oppenheim v. City of Florence, 155
So. 859 (Ala. 1934); Arkansas: Mississippi Valley Power Co. v. Board of improvements,
etc., 145 Ark. 76, 46 S. W. (2d) 32, 35 (1932); Jernigan v. Harris, 62 S, W. (2d) 5 (Ark.
1933); see McCutcheon v. City of Siloam Springs, 185 Ark. 76, 49 S. W. (2d) 1037,
1038 (1932); California: California Toll Bridge Authority' v. Wentworth, 212 Cal, 298,
298 Pac. 485 (1931) ; Shelton v. Los Angeles, 206 Cal. 544, 275 Pac. 421 (1929) ; California
Toll Bridge Authority v. Kelly, 21 P. (2d) 425 (Cal. 1933); Garrett v. Swanton, 216
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Only in a few States has the Special Fund Doctrine been disapproved,
Cal. 220, 13 P. (2d) 725 (1932); Department of Water & Power v. Vroman, 22 P. (2d)
69S (Cal. 1933); Colorado: Shields v. City of Loveland, 74 Colo. 27, 218 Pac. 913 (1923);
Searle v. Town of Haxtun, 84 Colo. 494, 271 Pac. 629, 630 (1928); Franklin Trust Co. v
City of Loveland, 3 F. (2d) 114 (1924); Reimer v. Town of Holyoke, 27 P. (2d) 1032
(Colo. 1933); Florida: State and Jos. Diver v. City of fiami, 152 So. 6 (Fla. 1934);
Illinois: Schnell v. City of Rock Island, 232 Ill. 89, 83 N. E. 462 (190S); Maffit v. City
of Decatur, 332 Ill. 82, 152 N. E. 602 (1926); Ward v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173
N. E. 610 (1930); City of Jerseyville v. Connett, 49 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931); cf.
Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861 (1902); Indiana: Fox v. Bicknell, 193 Ind.
537, 141 N. E. 222 (1932); Underwood v. Fairbanks-Morse & Co., 185 N. E. 118 (Ind.
1933); Indiana Service Corp. v. Town of Warren, 189 N. E. 523 (Ind. 1934); Iowa:
Johnston v. City of Stuart, 226 N. W. 164 (Iowa 1929); Wyatt v. Town of Manning, 250
N. W. 141 (Iowa 1933); Kansas: State ex rel. Boynton v. Highway Commis-ion, 28 P.
(2d) 770 (Kan. 1934); State ex rel. Boynton v. Highway Commission, 32 P. (2d) 493
(Kan. 1934); Kentucky: City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839, 295 S. W. 1004
(1927); Klein v. City of-Louisville, 224 Ky. 624, 6 S. W. (2d) 1104 (1928); Estes v.
Highway Commisson, 235 Ky. 86, 29 S. W. (2d) 583 (1930); Bloxton v. Highway Commission, 225 Ky. 324, 8 S. W. (2d) 392 (1928) ; Jones v. Corbin, 227 Ky. 674, 13 S. W. (2d)
1013 (1933); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. City of Paris, 248 Ky. 252, 58 S. W. (2d)
361 (1933); Williams v. City of Raceland, 245 Ky. 212, 53 S. W. (2d) 370 (1932);
Juett v. Williamstown, 248 Ky. 235, 58 S. W. (2d) 411 (1933); Wheeler v. Board of
Com'rs, 53 S. W. (2d) 740 (Ky. 1932); Michigan: Block v. City of Charlevoix, 255
N. W. 579 (Mich. 1934); Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 255 N. W. 579 (Mich. 1934);
Gilbert v. Traverse City, 255 N. W. 585 (Mich. 1934); Minnesota: Fanning v. University of Minn., 183 Minn. 222, 236 N. W. 47 (1931); Williams v. Village of Kenyon,
187 Minn. 161, 244 N. W. 558 (1932); Missouri: State v. City of Neosho, 203 Mo.
40, 101 S. W. 99 (1907); Bell v. City of Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 28 S. W. (2d) 356
(1930); Hight v. Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 41 S. W. (2d) 155 (1931); Hagler v. City
of Salem, 62 S. W. (2d) 751 (Mo. 1933); State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith, 74
S. W. (2d) 367 (Mo. 1934) ; Montana: Barbour v. State Board of Ed., 92 Mont. 321, 13
P. (2d) 225 (1932); Veeder v. State Board of Ed., 33 P. (2d) 516 (Mont. 1934); Blume
v. State Board of Ed., 34 P. (2d) 515 (Mont. 1934); Hawkins v. State Board of Examiners.
35 P. (2d) 116 (Mont. 1934); Nebraska: Carr v. Fenstermacher, 119 Neb. 172, 228 N. W.
114 (1929); Interstate Power Co. v. City of Ainsworth, 250 N. W. 649 (Neb. 1933);
Kirby v. Omaha Bridge Comm'n, 255 N. W. 776 (Neb. 1934); Nezw Mexico: State v.
University of N. M., 32 N. M. 428, 258 Pac. 57 (1927); Seward v. Bowers, 37 N. Lt. 3S5
24 P. (2d) 253 (1933); North Carolina: Brockenbrough v. Board of City Comm'rs, 134
N. C. 1, 46 S. E. 28 (1903); North Dakota: Lang v. Cavalier, 59 N. D. 75, 228 N. W. 819
(1930); State v. Davis, 59 N. D. 191, 229 N. IV. 105 (1930) Ohio: Kasch v. Miller, 105
Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 813 (1922); Pathe v. Donaldson, 29 Ohio App. 171, 163 N. E. 204
(1928); Oregon: McLain v. Regents, 124 Ore. 629, 265 Pac. 412 (1929); see Butler v.
Ashland, 113 Ore. 134, 232 Pac. 655, 657 (1925); South Carolina: Briggs v. Greenville
County, 137 S. C. 288, 135 S. E. 153 (1926); Cathcart v. City of Columbia, 170 S. E.
435 (S. C. 1933); Texas: Sewel v. Griffith, 294 S. E. 521 (Tex. 1927); Womack v. City of
West University Place, 32 S. W. (2d) 930 (Tex. 1930); City of Dayton v. Allred, 6S S. W.
(2d) 172 (Tex. 1934); City of Richmond v. Allred, 71 S. W. (2d) 233 (Tex. 1934); City
of Houston v. Allred, 71 S. W. (2d) 251 (Tex. 1934); Utah: Barnes v. Lehi City, 74 Utah
321, 279 Pac. 878 (1929); Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 28 P. (2d) 144 (Utah 1934); Wadsworth
v. Santaquin, 28 P. (2d) 161 (Utah 1934); Washington: Winston v. City of Spokane, 12
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and in some of these the disapproval is not clear cut. 74 The Supreme
Court of one of these States, Idaho, has recently indicated that if the
matter were before it for the first time, it would follow the majority of
the courts in upholding the Special Fund Doctrine,7 and others seem to
be wavering from their early positions."
Some States have drawn a distinction between revenue bonds issued
for the construction of a new utility, and revenue bonds issued to finance
additions or extensions to existing utilities, The States of Utah,"7 Mis8
souri,7" Alabama,79 South Dakota, 0 Oklahoma"' and California,"
have
held that when revenue obligations are issued to finance the construction
of improvements to a municipally-owned utility, and such obligations
Wash. 524, 41 Pac. 888 (1895); Faulkner v. Seattle, 19 Wash, 320, 53 Pac. 365 (1898);
Dean v. City of Walla Walla, 48 Wash. 75, 92 Pac. 895 (1907); Uhler v. City of
Olympia, 87 Wash. 1, 151 Pac. 117, 152 id. 998 (1915); Schooley v. City of Chehalls, 84
Wash. 667, 147 Pac. 410 (1915); Twitchell v. City of Seattle, 106 Wash. 32, 179 Pac. 127
(1919); Griffin v. City of Tacoma, 49 Wash. 424, 95 Pac. 1107 (1908); State v. Clausen,
134 Wash. 196, 235 Pac. 364 (1925) ; James v. City of Seattle, 300 Pac. 515 (Wash. 1931).
West Virginia: Bates v. State Bridge Commission, 109 W. Va. 186, 153 S. E. 305 (1930);
Brewer v. City of Point Pleasant, 172 S. E. 717 (W. Va. 1934); Casto and Shlnn v,
Town 'of Ripley, 173 S. E. Adv. Op. No. 6 (W. Va. 1934).
74. Georgia: Byars v. City of Griffin, 168 Ga. 41, 147 S. E. 66 (1929); Morton v.
City of Waycross, 173 Ga. 298, 160 S. E. 330 (1931); McCrary Co. v. Glennville, 149 Ga,
431, 100 S. E. 362 (1919) ; Idaho: Feil v. Coeur d'Alene, 23 Idaho 32, 129 Pac. 643 (1912) ;
Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 Pac. 843 (1930); Williams v. City of Emmett,
51 Idaho 500, 6 P. (2d) 475 (1931); Straughan v. Coeur d'Alene, 24 P. (2d) 321 (Idaho
1933); Maryland: Mayor of Baltimore v. Gill, 31 Md. 375 (1869); New Jersey: Wllgon
v. State Water Supply Commission, 84 N. J. Eq. 150, 93 Atl. 732 (1915); New York:
Rodman v. Munson, 13 Barb. 63 (N. Y. 1852), aff'd, id. at 188; Newell v. People, 7 N. Y:
9 (1852). But cf. Kelly v. Merry, 262 N. Y. 151, 186 N. E. 425 (1933). Oklahoma: Zachary
v. City of Wagoner, 146 Okla. 268, 292 Pac. 345 (1930); City of Tccumseh v. Butler,
148 Okla. 151, 298 Pac. 256 (1931). But cf. Baker v. Carter, 25 P. (2d) 747 (Okla. 1933)
Pennsylvania: Brown v. Corry, 175 Pa. 528, 34 Atl. 854 (1896) ; Lesser v. Warren Borough,
237 Pa. 501, 85 Atl. 839 (1912); Schuldice v. Pittsburg, 251 Pa. 28, 95 At. 938 (1915);
Hoffman v. Kline, 300 Pa. 485, 150 Atl. 889 (1930). But cf. Tranter v. Allegheny County
Authority, 173 At. 289 (Pa. 1934).
75. Straughan v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 24 P. (2d) 321 (Idaho 1933).
76. Tranter v. Allegheny County Authority, 173 Ati. 289 (Pa. 1934); Kelly v. Merry,
262 N. Y. 151, 186 N. E. 425 (1933); Baker v. Carter, 25 P. (2d) 747 (Okla. 1933).
77. Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 28 P. (2d) 144 (Utah 1933); Wadsworth v. Santaquin,
28 P. (2d) 161 (Utah 1933).
78. Hight v. Harrisonville, 328 Mo. 549, 41 S. W. (2d) 155 (1931); cf. Bell v. City of
Fayette, 325 Mo. 75, 28 S. W. (2d) 356 (1930); City of Campbell v. Arkansas-Mlisourl
Power Co., 55 F. (2d) 560 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932).
79. In re Opinion of the Justices, 226 Ala. 570, 148 So. 111 (1933).
80. Hesse v. Watertown, 57 S. D. 325, 232 N. W. 53 (1930).
81. Zachary v. City of Wagoner, 146 Okla. 268, 292 Pac. 345 (1930).
82. Garrett v. Swanton, 216 Cal. 220, 13 P. (2d) 725 (1932).
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are made payable from the revenues derived from the utility as improved,
the constitutional provisions are applicable.
The theory of these courts is that to the extent that the general fund
of the municipality is being deprived of revenues previously earned by
the particular utility, the general fund must be replenished by monies
raised by taxation, and, to this extent, the obligations are payable indirectly from taxation and therefore constitute an indebtedness of the
issuing municipality. 3 In such States the only way in which a municipality can finance the construction of improvements without incurring
an indebtedness, is by determining in advance what revenue will be
derived from the improvements and then making the bonds payable only
from such revenues. Thus far no workable system of allocation of revenues has been devised. 4 The Utah Legislature attempted to set up a
method of allocation by providing that when a municipality desires to
issue revenue bonds for improvements, its governing body shall declare
the value of the existing plant and the value of the proposed improvements. When the contemplated improvements have been constructed,
the revenues of the entire system are then divided in the same proportion
as the declared values and only those revenues which are thus allocated
to the improvements can be used for the payment of the bonds 5
This act was the subject of litigation in a case recently decided by the
Supreme Court of Utah."0 The majority of the court, though approving
the general scheme set up in the statutes, took issue with the manner in
which the city had applied the statutory provisions and enjoined the
issuance of the bonds on the ground that an improper allocation of revenues had been made. The implication of this case is that the determination of the amount of revenue properly allocable to an addition to, or
83. "It follows necessarily, therefore, that the burden of the general taxpayer will be
increased to make up to the general fund the amount which formerly went to the general
fund, but now is to be impounded in the waterworks fund to meet the obligations of the
water revenue bonds. Thus while tax revenues are not directly pledged to the payment of
water revenue bonds, the tax levy must be increased and such revenues will be indirectly uwed
to feed the special fund.' Per Folland, J., in Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 28 P. (2d) 144, 151
(Utah 1933).
84. "I do not concur in the conclusion reached nor the reasons given therefor in the
Santaquin Case on the subject or method of segregation of revenues derived from the
water-works system, and further, I do not see how the making of such segregation is
practicable or within any degree of certainty, and in the Odgen Case it in effect was
represented and conceded that it was impracticable if not impossible, if the improvements
were made, and the plant operated with them, to determine what of the net revenues
derived from the system were attributable to or occasioned by the improvements and
what from other portion or portions of the system.' Per Straup, C. J., dissenting in
Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 28 P. (2d) 144, 160 (Utah 1933).
85. Utah Laws 2d Spec. Sess. 1933, c. 22, § 14.
86. Wadsworth v. Santaquin, 28 P. (2d) 161 (Utah 1933).
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extension of, a particular utility is a judicial question and court review
is therefore necessary in many cases where such revenues are to be
pledged. 7
The experience of Ogden City Corporation bears witness to the unworkable features of this legislative attempt to circumvent the consequences of a restricted Special Fund theory. Since applying to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in 1932 for a self-liquidating loan to
finance needed improvements to its waterworks, Ogden City has been
before the Supreme Court of Utah on three occasions and has each time
failed to secure approval of its proposed bond issue.8 8 The practical
results of the Utah decisions are shown by the fact that PWA has not
been able to make a single loant, secured by revenue bonds for improvements to municipally owned utilities, to any municipality in Utah, unless
the municipality has complied with the constitutional requirement of
holding an election.
The courts of Oklahoma, 9 California 0 and Missouri" seem to be
gradually receding from their older decisions restricting the application
of the Special Fund Doctrine. The reasoning of the courts which hold
that a pledge of the revenues of an existing utility creates an indebtedness because it amounts to a drawing upon the general resources of the
city which must be replenished by taxation, does not withstand analysis.
In point of fact, the municipality is not taking money from its treasury,
but is only anticipating and pledging future revenues of a particular
utility. The rationale of the restricted theory is that it protects the
taxpayer. On the other hand, a wise expenditure of the revenues of a
utility for necessary improvements may do more to reduce taxes in the
long run than would the transfer of such revenues to a municipality's
general fund without regard to the physical needs of the system and the
possible reduction in the earning power of the enterprise.
The attitude expressed by the Supreme Court of Florida in a case
decided in 193492 represents a sound approach to the problem of revenue
financing. The court recognized that the issue was not to define the
meaning of the word "bonds" as used in the Constitution of the State
of Florida, but rather to decide whether a city owning a water supply
87. See dissent per Straup, C. J., in Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 28 P. (2d) 144, 160
(Utah 1934).
88. Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 28 P. (2d) 144 (Utah 1933), rehearing denied, 28 1'.
(2d) 160 (Utah 1933); Fjeldsted v. Ogden City, 35 P. (2d) 825 (Utah 1934).
89. Baker v. Carter, 25 P. (2d) 747 (Okla. 1933).
90. Department of Water and Power of Los Angeles v. Vroman, 22 P. (2d) 69F
(Cal. 1933).
91. State ex rel. City of Hannibal v. Smith, 74 S. W. (2d) 367 (Mo. 1934).
92. State and Jos. Diver v. City of Miami, 152 So. 6 (Fla. 1934).
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system from which it derives unpledged net revenues, which it is admittedly empowered to expend for any useful purpose, may anticipate such
revenues by borrowing money upon the security of a pledge of such
revenues. The Court was of the opinion that a municipal corporation,
engaged in the operation of a business enterprise in the nature of a public
utility, should be given the same freedom of action and control of the
revenues of enterprise as a privately owned public utility corporation
would have in the conduct of its affairs. The constitutional limitations
intended as safeguards against excessive borrowing by municipal corporations have no application if the obligations evidencing the borrowing are issued to finance the construction of a. municipal utility, or to
finance the improvement, repair or extension of such utility in order
to make it more efficient or economical in operation, or in order to
preserve or enlarge its usefulness to the community, and if the obligations simply anticipate the revenues of the utility, and the holders of
the obligations may look for payment solely to such revenues and have
no right to resort, either in the first instance, or in the event of deficiency,
to the taxing power. This must eventually become the law, if municipalities are to supply the public with social services required by modern
conditions and demanded by an aroused high-rate-paying public.
Recent legislation and court decisions show an unquestionable trend
toward an enlargement of municipal enterprise in the ownership and
administration of public and social services. With falling interest rates
and improving municipal credit, the progressive extension of self-liquidating municipal services at a moderate cost may be expected, particularly
in fields in which private enterprise cannot hope to compete. The broadened field of social service that the modern municipality will accord to
citizens will be due, in no small measure, to the use of devices like revenue
bonds, the sustained development of which will be traceable to the
present period. In the past two or three years, greater strides have
been made than ever before in the law relating to financing public improvements through the issuance of revenue obligations.
The novelty of this development is evidenced by the fact that a monumental work on the law of municipal corporations is little more than
silent on this subject. In the fourth edition of Dillon on Municipal
Corporations, published in 1890, one of the two chapters devoted to the
discussion of municipal charters contains a section eleven pages long
entitled, "Limitation on the power to create debts. ' e 3

In this section

there is a scanty discussion of the provisions in several State ConstituCoRpoRATIoNs (4th ed. 1890) pp. 197-203. The subject vas
93. 1 Du .oN, M IPAL
cI
treated briefly in each of the earlier editions. See 1 id. (3d ed. 1881) pp. 157-165; 1 id.
(2d ed. 1873) pp. 203-208; 1 id. (1st ed. 1872) pp. 130-134.
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ions limiting the incurring of indebtedness, but there is no treatment
in the text of the application of these provisions, to obligations payable
from a special fund. 4 The fifth edition of Dillon's treatise, which appeared in 1911, contains a full chapter covering more than one hundred
pages entitled, "Constitutional Limitations and Restrictions on Power
to Incur Debt." 5 This chapter has a section discussing obligations
payable only from a special fund which deals mainly with .the law
relating to contracts for the construction of local improvements, which
provide that the payment for the improvement shall be made from assessments levied against the property specially benefited by the improvement. Revenue obligations issued by a municipality for the purpose
of constructing or improving municipally owned enterprises are passed
over very briefly? 6 The present trend toward the extension of municipal
ownership of public service enterprises, at a time when numerous municipalities are climbing near their constitutional and economic limit of indebtedness, makes municipal obligations payable solely from the revenues of a municipally owned enterprise a timely subject for further
research, analysis, and constructive thought."
94. The case of Newell v. People, 3 Seld. 9 (N. Y. 1852) is cited in a footnote for
the proposition: "That a debt may be created by borrowing money, although there be a
provision exempting the borrower from liability beyond the property pledged." 1 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (4th ed. 1890) p. 198.
95. 1 DILor, MuiicCiPA. CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 1911) pp. 336-438. The author
stated: "The subject is so important, and the decisions construing and applying the constltutional provisions and showing their practical workings are so numerous, that in this
edition of the present work we have felt that it was necessary to prepare a 4fiw chapter
entirely devoted to its consideration." 1 id. at 337.
96. The text discusses the holdings in the cases of Winston v. City of Spokane, 12
Wash. 524, 41 Pac. 888 (1895) and Brockenbrough v. Board of City Conm'rs, 134 N. C. 1,
46 S. E. 28 (1903).
97. On the expanding scope of municipal services, for example in South Carolina, see
Stabler, J., in Park v. Greenwood County, Opinion No. 13931, filed October 31, 1934
(not yet reported), holding an electric light and power plant is a proper corporate purpose
for a county. Cf. McGowan, J., in Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 33 S. C. 1, 11
S. E. 434 (1890), holding an incandescent lighting system not a proper corporate purpose for
a city: "The power given to the city council to Issue bonds, so as to bind not only all the
taxpayers of the city, but their children as well, is a very high confidence and trust and
can be properly exercised for no other purpose than 'for the public use of the corporation,'
no matter how great the temptation may be. Without regard to good 'business arrangements,'
which may present themselves, such a power must be strictly pursued. . . . We cannot
doubt that the purchase of the system producing incandescent lights, so far as It was to
furnish lights to private persons, with or without compensation, was not a corporate act
of the city council, and binding upon the corporators, but was beyond their authority,
as the governing body of the corporation." 11 S. E. 434, 438.

